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A B S T R A C T
Modern computer networks generate significant volume of behavioural system logs on a
daily basis. Such networks comprise many computers with Internet connectivity, and many
users who access the Web and utilise Cloud services make use of numerous devices con-
nected to the network on an ad-hoc basis. Measuring the risk of cyber attacks and identifying
the most recent modus-operandi of cyber criminals on large computer networks can be dif-
ficult due to the wide range of services and applications running within the network, the
multiple vulnerabilities associated with each application, the severity associated with each
vulnerability, and the ever-changing attack vector of cyber criminals. In this paper we propose
a framework to represent these features, enabling real-time network enumeration and traffic
analysis to be carried out, in order to produce quantified measures of risk at specific points
in time. We validate the approach using data from a University network, with a data col-
lection consisting of 462,787 instances representing threats measured over a 144 hour period.
Our analysis can be generalised to a variety of other contexts.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Quantifying the risk of cyber attacks due to software applica-
tions on a computer network at any given time,measuring the
impact of an attack, and understanding attack patterns are
complex and challenging tasks. The complexity is com-
pounded by an increasing number of networked devices being
brought into modern networked environments on an ad-hoc
basis. Such devices often have a large number of software ap-
plications (“apps”) installed, which can leave the devices, and
subsequently the whole network, vulnerable to cyber threats.
To compound the cyber securitymanagement difficulties posed
by such infrastructure, the techniques and attack vectors used
by cyber criminals are increasinglymature,stealthyanddynamic.
Installing and configuring network defence systems such as
Firewalls and IntrusionDetection Systems (IDS) provide an initial
barrier to cyber attacks but the inclusion of personal devices
and remoteworking has contributed to the de-perimeterisation
of computer networks (Burnap and Hilton, 2009),meaning that
network level defences alone are not sufficient to defend against
these new and emerging issues. Individuals, companies, and
governments may become victims of cyber crime, as well as
(involuntary) helpers of cyber criminals.
Advances in network traffic analysis (Dantu et al., 2004;
Frigault et al., 2008; Liu and Man, 2005; Poolsappasit et al., 2012;
Xie et al., 2010) have enabled network administrators to track
and respond to malicious activity with increasing levels of ac-
curacy and effectiveness to reduce the potential for harm on
network users. However, given the large number of applications
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running within each network, the vulnerabilities inherent in
these applications with new ones being discovered by cyber
criminals on a daily basis, and the variance in the severity of
an exploit or a vulnerability will affect the network and users.
Therefore, conducting real-time risk assessments and deter-
mining the most pertinent risks to manage at any given time
is far from straightforward. A need arises for an effective, cost-
efficient and reliable mechanism for continuously monitoring
and assessing risk arising due to software applications.
The continuous monitoring and assessment of risk mainly
depends on an automated data collection process for storing
logs containing malicious traffic instances and then their analy-
sis. Such an analysis could help identify cyber-attack patterns,
the associated risks with different types of cyber-attacks and
their assessment in terms of some numeric score to help a
network administrator take appropriate responsive actions (Kott
and Arnold, 2013).This whole process involves two main chal-
lenges: (i) integration and pre-processing of the data feeds with
diverse content and timeliness, originating across different seg-
ments of an organisational network; and (ii) using a suitable
risk scoring algorithm to help support a network administra-
tor better characterise risk under given environmental
conditions. However, existing risk scoring and assessment
mechanisms such as Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS) (First, 2015), CORAS (Lund et al., 2011), ISO/IEC 27001:2013
(ISO, 2013), etc., require subjective, human-based qualitative
inputs, which could potentially lead to inaccurate (ambigu-
ous) and inconclusive results. Further, presenting a holistic view
of the organisation-wide risk, distributed over different seg-
ments of the network over time, is of much more importance
than simply reporting static risk scores (generally achieved by
simply summing up the reported vulnerabilities across the
network and reporting this as a single numeric value) (Kott and
Arnold, 2013).
In this paper we propose a framework for the formalisation
and integration of risk factors affecting a computer network
(primarily a University network). Such a framework enables risk
scores to be produced at various levels within the network over
time, underpinning a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment
model, which are then combined to represent the relative risks
within a network in much the same way as a geographic map
of terrestrial crime would represent crime “hotspots”.This pro-
vides an intuitive representation of risk and enables
administrators to “zoom” in and out of the risk model to de-
termine and understand the most “at-risk” components within
a network, sub-network and hosted application over time.We
consider the threats targeting a given software application
running within a network, their severity, and their frequency
of occurrence over a given period of time to calculate an overall
risk score, which is then used to provide a separate view of
cyber risk hotspots posed by internally and externally hosted
software applications. The application-specific cyber risk
hotspots are further investigated for identification of most criti-
cal threats targeting different software applications using a
decision tree structure to help network administrator(s) take
immediate responses. The main contributions of our work
include:
1. proposing risk metrics which could be calculated more ob-
jectively, rather than using subjective, human-based
qualitative inputs to identify cyber risk hotspots in a com-
puter network
2. modelling temporal risk behaviour of software applica-
tions and understanding the effectiveness of security policies
3. devising mechanism for alerting network administrator to
take precautionary measures before the risk score signifi-
cantly increases
4. identifying cyber risk hotspots emerging over a period of
time in a computer network
5. investigating causes of emerging cyber risk hotspots asso-
ciated with a particular software application
Using system log data (from an IPS/IDS) to inform a dynami-
cally updated risk assessment, we validate the framework by
using real-time system logs collected within a University
network.The logs provide the frequency of threat exploits at an
application level, and a severity score for each threat. A Uni-
versity network is particularly suitable to validate the framework
as it contains multiple sub-networks distributed across differ-
ent geographic locations,more than 34,000 users (both staff and
students), and a large number of computing devices. Further-
more, users tend to work remotely and access machines within
the network from external locations, requiringWeb-facing ports
to be opened. Although we have used a measurement based
study to validate our approach, the results presented can be
generalised to other similar University networks (which also have
similar user communities, also making use of similar types of
hosted applications).
2. Related work
A Bayesian network based risk management framework, called
Bayesian Attack Graphs (BAG), has been proposed for assess-
ing risk in a computer network thereby enabling system
administrators to make decisions, e.g., apply a security patch,
use firewall, disable the service, disconnect from Internet, in
the operational environment.The model incorporated both the
cause–consequence relationships and the likelihoods of ex-
ploiting them for estimating security risks for an organisation
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
metrics (First, 2015). BAG has been used for better understand-
ing the causal relationships between various network states
and computing the likelihood of exploiting such relation-
ships. The study further proposed and developed a genetic
algorithm for optimising administrators’ objectives for miti-
gating risks (Poolsappasit et al., 2012). However, the authors have
only considered risk at a particular point in time, and not con-
sidered the likely variation in risk over time – the latter being
an important component of our proposed risk assessment
framework.
Dantu et al. (2004) used attack graphs to model network vul-
nerabilities and then deployed a Bayesian logic based probabilistic
model for network risk assessment. They associated a prob-
ability with each of the nodes in the attack graph to represent
the likelihood of an attack on a network.These probabilities were
initially used for computing the likelihood of system compro-
mise and later for calculating the organisational risk. They
calculated organisational risk using synthetic network data.We
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make use of real network data for identifying components within
our framework and calculate the associated risk values.
Liu and Man (2005) modelled potential attack paths using
Bayesian networks and considered attack mechanisms and
background knowledge of attackers for computing an optimal
subset of potential attack paths.The authors labelled their ap-
proach as a Bayesian attack graph.The nodes in Bayesian attack
graph have an associated probability value describing the like-
lihood of an attack, which is then used for calculating
organisational risk. They have not specified how to calculate
the attack probabilities associated with each node. A security
risk analysis of networked systems has been carried out using
Bayesian networks to model uncertainties in attack struc-
ture, attacker actions and alerts. The study involved near real-
time analysis of the network data to identify a suitable security
response for the identified intrusions using a Bayesian network
(Xie et al., 2010). The authors used the term Security Graph
Model to refer to the graph models used for network security
analysis. The study focused on identifying vulnerable ma-
chines, undetected exploits and missing threats. We have
modelled attack patterns, their intensities and frequencies of
occurrence under given conditions and have also considered
temporal aspects of an attack and its spread through a network.
A dynamic Bayesian Network-based model, which incor-
porated the evolution of vulnerabilities over time in the attack
graph, has been proposed by Frigault et al. (2008). The model
derived its parameters from the widely used network values
of CVSS (First, 2015) and the attack graphs, and focused on sup-
porting security monitoring in a dynamic network environment.
The authors used simulated examples for validating their
model, whereas our model uses real-world data.
Dantu et al. (2007) have performed a study to estimate and
classify attack behaviour types based on survey results. The
study surveyed the social and behavioural profiles of individu-
als to classify their behavioural resources, e.g., skill level, time
and attitude – as opportunist, hacker, or explorer behaviour.
The classification was further used to determine the associ-
ated risk with the behavioural resources to formulate risk
management strategies. Our framework models threats asso-
ciated with individual software hosted over a network-based
infrastructure, ranking themost vulnerable of these. Dantu et al.
(2009) have hypothesised the relationship between network
action sequence and attack behaviour, and proposed a 5-step
model for detecting and estimating risk based on attack graphs
and attacker behaviours. The model has been reported to be
useful for minimising network vulnerabilities. Our frame-
work models risks within a network over a particular time
period and ranks the attack paths for consideration by a
network administrator.
A service dependency graph based cost-sensitive intrusion-
response system has been proposed to evaluate the three
fundamental security principles: confidentiality, integrity and
availability (Kheir et al., 2010). The study reported difficulties
in identifying the potential impact on confidentiality and in-
tegrity after responding to an attack. Our framework uses
parameters from the malicious network traffic data for calcu-
lating risk, which is then used for identifying the cyber risk
hotspots in a computer network and assisting a network ad-
ministrator to make suitable responses inline with the
fundamental security principles.
A component-based architecture has been proposed for mea-
suring the impact of an attack and then finding a suitable
corresponding response while considering the associated costs
and benefits.The model, being non-graph based in nature, uses
an Observable Markov Decision Process to assess state of system
assets from network security perspective (which can be normal,
probing, under exploitation and compromised), selects a ra-
tional defence response for preserving security properties of
a more secure system while considering potential cost factors
(Zhang et al., 2009). Our framework evaluates and models risks
within a network using objective parameters from the mali-
cious network traffic data while following a continuous
monitoring approach and helps in identifying and ranking the
attack paths to enable a network administrator to take appro-
priate actions promptly.
A recent survey of risk assessment and network Intrusion
Response Systems (IRS) proposed a taxonomy, highlighting their
key features and limitations. The study suggested several re-
search directions to improve IRS, one of which was to improve
the link between risk assessment and intrusion response
(Shameli-Sendi et al., 2014). Much of the existing literature at-
tempts to automate this process. Our work presents an
approach to risk assessment that provides a set of probabi-
listic metrics to represent risk at software application and sub-
network levels, which can then be used to inform a security
policy and lead to the dynamic configuration of intrusion re-
sponses.We have validated our proposed approach using real-
world traffic data. Essentially, security policy can be modified
by the network administrator based on the identification of
emerging threats and risk “hotspots” in a network.
A hierarchical task network planning model using a non-
graph based approach was proposed by Mu and Li (2010), which
calculates risk thresholds by considering its positive and nega-
tive effects. The calculated risk threshold values have an
associated response, which is triggered when a risk thresh-
old exceeds a (pre-defined, static) response threshold. The
approach reported less false positives due to the use of the re-
sponse risk threshold. The study further proposed the use of
a response selection window for supporting the most effec-
tive responses.We have used a decision tree for identifying and
ranking attack paths to help a network administrator take ap-
propriate actions. We do not make direct use of thresholds,
however our approach can be easily extended with this. An im-
portant limitation is understanding what values these
thresholds should be set to – often based on the experience
of an administrator and the likely vulnerability of a network.
A dependency attack graph based approach, wherein the
dependency attack graph is systematically integrated with
Hidden Markov Models, has been proposed for investigating
system-level vulnerabilities using probabilistic relations byWang
et al. (2013). The study suggested a set of organisation-level
metrics and cost factors for calculating the associated cost of
an attack and its defence. We assume that the cost of carry-
ing out any action is identical, with the key selection criterion
being the frequency of an attack.
An attack graph based model for evaluating risk in a con-
sidered computer network has been proposed by Kanoun et al.
(2008), which computes risk by combining two major factors:
potentiality and impact. Potentiality determines the probabil-
ity of an attack being successful depending on natural
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exposition and dissuasive measures, while impact param-
eters correspond to: (a) availability; (b) confidentiality; and
(c) integrity and are dynamically calculated.We use objective
parameters from the malicious network traffic for calculat-
ing risk. Our framework calculates risk values at different levels
with software application threat as the fundamental cause of
risk. A software application is susceptible to multiple threats
while a subnetwork has many different types of software ap-
plications running in it. Further, our framework also supports
continuousmonitoring of risks and provides a consolidated view
of risk at multiple levels in a computer network.
3. Risk assessment framework
Network administrators have the challenging responsibility of
assessing risk to the networks at any time and then to plan
the remedies accordingly. Traditionally, two methods for risk
assessment are generally used – either the CORASMethod (Lund
et al., 2011) and/or the use of a standard-based management
framework such as ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (ISO, 2013). The CORAS
Method (Lund et al., 2011) is a model-driven risk analysis ap-
proach that follows an 8-step methodology for threat and risk
modelling. Structured brainstorming activities are performed
for identifying threats, threat scenarios, vulnerabilities asso-
ciated with organisational assets, risks, estimated impact of
risk and suitable treatments for identified risks. CORAS Method
suggests a one-off risk analysis of the system and as it in-
volves meetings and lengthy discussions between various
stakeholders for identifying risks and threat scenarios, it is not
suitable for efficient and continuous monitoring of a com-
puter network. Similarly, a management framework for risk
assessment and their potential mitigation has been provided
by ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (ISO, 2013), which requires continuous
subjective input by the stakeholders for calculating potential
risk to the considered network. Our risk assessment frame-
work uses traffic logs without involving continuous subjective
input at every time instance from a network administrator for
assessing risk and can be effectively used for continuous risk
monitoring at smaller time granularity. Further, the frame-
work presents a holistic view of risk by first identifying cyber
risk hotspots associated with a particular software applica-
tion emerging over a period of time and then investigating the
causes of their emergence.
A risk score is calculated based on the likelihood of a threat,
and the business impact due to the threat represents the se-
curity risk assessment.The existing risk scoring algorithms have
been driven by ad hoc heuristics, and are based on a subjec-
tive, human-based assessment.These often lead to risk metrics
which have a potentially misleading and ambiguous nature (Kott
and Arnold, 2013). Lack of theoretical foundations for quan-
titative characterisation of risk, its distribution over different
segments of a network as well as time, and empirical valida-
tion of risk metrics require better mechanisms for computing
andmodelling risk across a computer network (Kott and Arnold,
2013). The risk score calculation has a further limitation of
normalising different severity levels. Our risk assessment frame-
work handles the limitations of both the CORAS Method and
the ISO/IEC 27001:2013, as well as the existing (subjective) risk
scoring algorithms. In this section we formalise the terms used
in our proposed risk assessment framework and the associ-
ated network components to which they apply.
3.1. Main components
Our proposed risk assessment framework makes use of the fol-
lowing representation:
1. Software, S i= { }α α α α1 2 3, , , ,
2. Threat Category, H j= { }Λ Λ Λ Λ1 2 3, , , ,
3. Threat, Λ = { }λ λ λ λ1 2 3, , , , k
4. Severity, R sev sev sev sevl= { }1 2 3, , , ,
A computer network, divided into subnetworks Z, can host
multiple software applications α within a subnet. A software
application may be exposed to potential cyber attacks.We rep-
resent an attack as a threat, λ. An individual λ may be
characterised using a number of parameters, e.g.: threat struc-
ture describing how an attack is carried out, delivery, breach
and affect stages, targeted service, duration of attack. Threats
can then be grouped based on common values across there
parameters. The distinct j threat categories, Λ, are grouped in
H. Each individual threat (λ) has associated effect/impact that
it could inflict on a network. An inflicted effect by a threat has
a certain level of severity (sev), with different severity levels
that depend on the classification provided by either an intru-
sion detection system/firewall or the network administrator.
The set, R, contains the defined l possible severity classifica-
tions for a given network environment. Once an attack has been
identified, a suitable response is needed to control and mini-
mise the damage due to the attack on a given subnet.
A network administrator can find a suitable response for
a cyber attack by following either Threat-focused or Software-
focused approach. Threat-focused approach identifies the most
frequently occurring threats in a computer network with their
multiple targeted software applications (see Fig. 1a). Such an
approach requires iteratively fixing the effects of a particular
Fig. 1 – Cyber attack modelling approaches.
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threat on each targeted software application, e.g., λ1 targets
α α αx x x n, , ,+ +1  , λ2 targets α α αy y y n, , ,+ +1  and λk targets
α α αz z z n, , ,+ +1  , then for each λ λ λ1 2, , , k all the targeted soft-
ware applications will require application of appropriate security
controls by a network administrator. If αx = αy = αz then this soft-
ware application will be fixed in multiple iterations depending
on the number of individual threats targeting it. From a network
administrator’s perspective, following a threat-focused ap-
proach for modelling cyber attacks and then finding and
applying remedy controls for each threat independently can
be a complex, lengthy and expensive process, however, the ap-
proach can be useful for cybersecurity researchers who aremore
interested in analysing the targets and behaviours of indi-
vidual threats. On the other hand, Software-focused approach
identifies most frequently targeted software applications due
to multiple threats in a computer network (see Fig. 1b), e.g.,
α1 is targeted by λ λ λx x x n, , ,+ +1  , α2 is targeted by λ λ λy y y n, , ,+ +1 
and αi is targeted by λ λ λz z z n, , ,+ +1  . This is useful for identi-
fying cyber hotspots due to software applications in a computer
network from various views. Contrary to Threat-focused ap-
proach, a network administrator can easily take appropriate
control measures for enhancing the security of the network
by following Software-focused approach.We, in this study, take
Software-focused approach for assessing andmonitoring risk due
to software applications running in a computer network.
We propose two risk metrics, Risk Score and Risk Grade, for
identifying cyber risk hotspots in a computer network.
3.2. Risk score
Risk has been traditionally calculated as a product of likeli-
hood of threats and impact on an organisation with both of
the parameters depending on the subjective beliefs of the
system administrator about the computer network of the
organisation (Poolsappasit et al., 2012). Risk calculated in such
a way has two main limitations: (1) using subjective beliefs of
the system administrator; and (2) averaging out threat severi-
ties and their impact on the organisation. This is generally
unhelpful, as understanding the potential impact of an indi-
vidual threat is necessary to determine a potential response
to it (rather than considering an average value that considers
a variety of threats in aggregate).
We define Risk score associated with a particular threat as
a product of: (1) conditional probability of a given software ap-
plication targeted by threat(s); (2) severity of each threat
instance; and (3) a constant factor to avoid averaging out varied
threat severities for two more threat instances, summed over
all software applications. A time unit t is associated with Risk
score so that it can be used for continuous monitoring of soft-
ware application risks across computer networks.We use Risk
score for identifying cyber risk hotspots in a network to enable
a network administrator get better insight of occurrence of po-
tential risk patterns in different sub-networks, their trends and
variations over a period of time and their sources across the
network in much the same way as a terrestrial map of crime
would represent crime at the country, county, policing ward
and street level. A description of each of Risk score param-
eters is given below.
A software application α may offer multiple services. Each
of these services may have an associated threat λ at time t.
Hence, there may be multiple threats associated with the same
application, making it possible to calculate the total vulner-
ability of an application by aggregating all threats at a particular
point in time. The probability of a given software application,
α, targeted by threat, λ, at time t is represented as Pr tiλ α( ) ( ),
where i is an identifier value for λ. For example, considering
our data set described later in the paper, α = “MS-RDP”, which
has an associated threat λ = “MS-RDP Brute-force attempt” (bfa)
at t = 1, has PrbfaMS RDP− ( ) =1 0 86. . The granularity of one time in-
stance has been taken as an hour.
The severity of a threat targeting a software application has
a corresponding numeric value ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. For en-
suring that numeric values for corresponding severity levels
remain equidistant from each other and within the range 0–1,
the equidistant factor is calculated using 11l− , where l repre-
sents the possible number of linguistic labels used for classifying
the severity intensity levels. The term l − 1 has been used to
ensure that the lowest label type always has a numeric value
equal to 0.0. For example, our data set has 5 severity levels:
critical, high,medium, low and informational.The equidistant factor
for 5 severity levels is 15 1 0 25− = . . The corresponding numeric
values for severity labels based on the equidistant factor are:
critical = 1.0, high = 0.75, medium = 0.50, low = 0.25 and
informational = 0.0.
A constant, Wsev , is used to give higher preference to a threat
with higher severity over another threat with a lower sever-
ity in order to avoid averaging out these varied threat severities
while calculating Risk score. For example, α = “Steam” has two
associated threats, λ1 = " "WindowsDLL having low severity and
λ2 7= −" "ZipARJFile with high severity; then Wsev ensures
that λ2 is given a higher weighting while calculating the risk
score value for the software application, in this case “Steam”.
Wsev is assigned a numeric value based on the number of se-
verity intensity levels, m. The value of Wsev for the lowest
severity level is 0.0 and increases by m for each higher sever-
ity level. For the aforementioned 5 severity levels, the associ-
ated constant factor values are Wcritical = 20 0. , Whigh = 15 0. ,
Wmedium = 10 0. , Wlow = 5 0. and Winformational = 0 0. .
Given a software application α targeted by threat λn at
time t, where n is the threat identifier, the probability of α
targeted by λn is Pr tiλ α( ) ( ); severity of λn is sev; and Wsev is
the constant factor; then we calculate Risk score associated
with α at time t represented as Riskα(t) using the following
equation:
Risk t Pr t sev Wn sev
n
j
α λ α( ) = ( )∗( )∗( )
=
∑
1
(1)
For example, based on our data considering α = “MS-RDP”
which has an associated threat λ = “MS-RDP Brute-force attempt”
(bfa) with sev = “high”. The probability of occurrence of λ given
α at t = 1 represented as PrbfaMS RDP− ( ) =1 0 86. .The numeric values
for sev = “high” = 0.75 and Whigh = 15 0. give a risk score value,
RiskMS RDP− ( ) = ∗( )∗( ) =1 0 86 0 75 15 0 9 67. . . . .
We further use Risk score to calculate software application-
specific risk given a particular subnetwork Z at time t
represented as Risk tZα ( ) in order to identify the cyber risk
hotspots due to α running in Z. Pr tn Zλ α( ) ( ), represents the prob-
ability of λ(n) targeting α running in a subnetwork Z at time t.
We use the following equation:
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Risk t Pr t sev WZ n Z sev
n
j
α λ α( ) = ( )∗( )∗( )
=
∑ ,
1
(2)
Continuing from MS-RDP example, if MS-RDP is only used
in Z = “Campus” at t = 1 with PrbfaMS RDP Campus− ( ) =, .1 0 86, then
RiskMS RDPCampus− ( ) =1 9 67. .
Risk score can be used for identifying cyber risk hotspots
due to multiple software applications running in a subnet-
work. A network administrator can compare the risk scores of
different software applications running in a particular sub-
network at a given time to review the security policies. The
results of this scenario can be used for doing a comparison
between different subnetworks of a large computer network
to identify the most and the least targeted subnetworks. The
Risk score of a given subnetwork Z at time t represented as
RiskZ(t) is a summation of all software application-specific risks
in that particular subnetwork at that time instance (as calcu-
lated in Eq. 2). We use the following equation for calculating
risk in this scenario:
Risk t Risk tZ n Z
n
i
( ) = ( )( )
=
∑ α
1
(3)
For example, in Z = “Campus” when three software appli-
cations, MS-RDP, web-browsing and Google-play, are used at
t = 1 with RiskMS RDPCampus− ( ) =1 9 67. , Riskweb browsing Campus− ( ) =1 1 4.
and Riskgoogle play Campus− ( ) =1 0 4. , then RiskCampus 1 11 47( ) = . .
3.3. Risk grade
As risk score (Risk) is often a single number (associated with
λ, α or Z), it does not provide any insight about the likely causes
of these threats. In Fig. 1a, the association between threats (λ)
and particular software (α) which are impacted by these threats
is shown – illustrating how the same threat can be found in
multiple types of software applications. Conversely, in Fig. 1b,
we illustrate how multiple threats (λ) may impact a particu-
lar software application (α). We define “Risk Grade” RG using
a decision tree to help identify and rank the specific threats,
λ, occurring over a time period for software α, being used in a
particular subnetwork (Z). The decision tree (see Fig. 2) shows
a two-level of edge hierarchy for threat classification. For
example, Λ = Spywarewill assist a network administrator to look
for anti-spyware solutions. Each individual threat, λ, has an as-
sociated severity.This association between software applications
and threat categories, and threat categories and threats, is rep-
resented as edges, ei and ej respectively. These edges form a
path, P for each λ linked with a particular α in the decision tree.
An edge ei represents the exploitation of a software appli-
cation α running in a sub-network Z by a particular threat
category, Λ. The set E1 contains all possible ei due to Λn. Simi-
larly, edge ej represents the specific exploitation with a specific
severity sev by an individual threat, λ, belonging to a particu-
lar threat category, Λ. All threat-specific edges, ej, are included
in the set E2. Then Pk is the attack path explored by a threat
given a software application running in a sub-network.
Given the following formalised definition of ei, ej and Pk, we
calculate RG(Pk) using Eq. (4):
1. e Z Ei a b n= ( ) ∈α , Λ 1
2. e Ej n o= ( ) ∈Λ , λ 2
3. P e ek i j= ( )∪
RG P Pr e Pr e Wk i j sev( ) = ( )∗ ( )( ) + (4)
where RG(Pk) is the Risk Grade value for attack path Pk, Pr(ei)
is the probability of occurrence of a particular threat cat-
egory when using a given software application, Pr(ej) is the
probability of occurrence of an individual threat with a spe-
cific severity when using a given software application, and Wsev
Fig. 2 – Risk grade decision tree.
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is the associated weighting factor, as described in Section
3.2.
The identification of such paths enables a mitigation strat-
egy to be supported, e.g. updating the software to a newer
version, deploying more robust security software or modify-
ing a security policy.When there are several threats at the same
severity level associated with a software application in a given
sub-network, RG value will enable a network administrator to
identify how to prioritise on responding to these threats. Iden-
tification of such paths also enables threats associated with
a particular software running within different subnetworks to
be compared.
Given two paths, P1 and P2, if RG P RG P1 2( ) > ( ) then P1 has
higher priority than P2 to assist a network administrator take
appropriate decisions for enforcing security policies.
For example, a software application, α = −web browsing, is
running in Untrust subnetwork (see Fig. 11). Three threat cat-
egories, Spyware, Vulnerability and Virus, exploit web-browsing.
These three exploitation paths are represented by three edges,
e1, e2 and e3 respectively.The probabilities associated with each
of the edges indicating possibility of following them are
Pr e1 0 0500( ) = . , Pr e2 0 8750( ) = . and Pr e3 0 0750( ) = . . The threat
category Λ = Vulnerability has two threats, HTTP related and
ASP.NET Path, which exploit web-browsing running in Untrust
subnetwork and are represented by edges ej1 and ej2 respec-
tively. This will give us two paths in the decision tree: (1) P1
which consists of e2 and ej1; and (2) P2 which consists of e2 and
ej2 . The probabilities of occurrences of the threats are
Pr ej1 0 8572( ) = . and Pr ej2 0 1428( ) = . . Both threats, HTTP
related and ASP.NET Path, result in severity with a high level
and have a value of Whigh = 15 0. . Using Eq. (6), the values of
RG for the two paths will be: RG P Pr e Pr e Wj high1 2 1( ) = ( )∗ ( )( ) +
0 8750 0 8572 15 15 7501∗= ( ) + =. . . and RG P Pr e Pr ej2 2 2( ) = ( )∗ ( )( )
Whigh 0 8750 0 1428 15 15 1250+ ∗= ( ) + =. . . . Based on RG value, P1
has higher priority than P2.
4. Validation environment for risk framework
We have based our study onmalicious network traffic data logs
generated by the Palo Alto Networks IPS/IDS software Wild-
fire, which has been used as a security measure to protect more
than 34,000 registered users of the University Campus network
from cyber attacks. It protects the network from both known
and previously unknown malware, zero-day exploits, and Ad-
vanced Persistent Threats (APTs).Wildfire can identify over 200
potentially malicious behaviours and is capable of classify-
ing all traffic across nearly 400 applications (Palo Alto Networks,
2015a, 2015b). When incoming traffic is classified as mali-
cious, it is pushed to a RabbitMQ queuing system for further
investigation.
The dataset used for validating this study was collected
during the regular academic year fromMarch 26, 2014 to March
31, 2014.We accessed malicious data logs of 6 consecutive days
in CSV format, obtained through RabbitMQ, for validating our
risk framework. Each malicious traffic instance had 41 attri-
butes giving information about both source and destination
IP addresses, ports, zones and countries; threats, threat cat-
egories, threat severity levels, threat occurrence time; software
applications targeted; classification rule, protocols, ingress and
egress interfaces as well as miscellaneous information.The log
files were preprocessed to extract information about threats,
threat instances, threat categories, threat severity levels, threat
occurrence time, software applications targeted and the sub-
networks on which these threats appeared. These were then
divided into hourly intervals for subsequent analysis. The col-
lected malicious traffic data have 462,787 instances, containing
278 unique threats, across 6 distinct threat categories (vulner-
ability, file, virus, scan, spyware and packet). Each threat also
has a severity level associated with it, and can be: informa-
tional, low, medium, high and critical. These threats originate
from 86 source locations in various countries and exploit 90
different software applications used across the various sub-
networks being monitored within the University networks
(Campus, Campus-SrvNets, DC-DMZ, Reslan, Untrust, Wire-
less). Table 1 gives a description of the six subnetworks of the
University networks used in this study.
Our data show 99.45% of malicious traffic targeting 14 soft-
ware applications, which may be internally (within the
University network) or externally hosted (accessed via a Web
portal for instance). The top 7 most targeted internally hosted
applications (with percentage threats over the observation
period) are: (1) MS-RDP (82.18%); (2) DNS (0.85%); (3) SSH (0.78%);
(4) SMTP (0.62%); (5) RPC (0.19%); (6) FTP (0.06%); and (7) MS-
DS-SMB (0.04%). Likewise, the top 7 most targeted externally
hosted applications/services are: (1)Web-browsing (10.78%); (2)
Steam (1.17%); (3) Google-play (1.02%); (4) Sharepoint-base
(0.60%); (5) Apple-Appstore (0.60%); (6) Avast-av-update (0.33%);
and (7) Funshion (0.23%). These data show malicious traffic
highly skewed towards the use of MS-RDP software applica-
tion (based on applications that were hosted in our observed
network). Our risk framework can be generalised for mali-
cious data logs obtained from other commonly used network
security software such as from IBM (IBM, 2015), McAfee (McAfee,
2015), Symantec (Symantec, 2015), Sophos (Sophos, 2015) and
Zone Alarm (ZoneAlarm, 2015).
5. Results
The collected data set has been used to validate the use of our
proposed risk framework, primarily to identify potential cyber
Table 1 – Subnetworks in the university network.
Subnetwork Description
Campus This subnet contains workstations mainly
used by staff and in classrooms/labs
Campus-SrvNets This subnet provides processing of
non-sensitive information as part of campus
services
DC-DMZ This subnet has physical servers providing
front end/middleware services to trusted
backends and is likely to be exposed to the
Internet
Reslan This subnet contains the computing devices
used in student residences network
Untrust This subnet provides the network connection
routes to all sponsored sites as well as the
Internet
Wireless This subnet provides current guest roaming
and extended eduroam services
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Fig. 3 – Risk score for top 7 internally hosted software applications.
Fig. 4 – Risk score for top 7 externally hosted software applications.
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risk hotspots based on the use of particular software applica-
tions. In the following subsections, we determine risk scores
and how these change over our observation period for the soft-
ware applications/services we monitor. Using a statistical
analysis of these data, we describe how alerts can be gener-
ated for network administrators in order for them to take
suitable precautionary measures. We use risk scores to iden-
tify the cyber risk hotspots emerging over the period of time
and then the risk grade values for investigating the causes of
emerging cyber risk hotspots.
5.1. Risk modelling for frequently targeted software
applications
We have followed a continuous monitoring approach with a
time granularity of one hour to model the risk score of the 14
most targeted software applications in the University network
over a period of 144 hours.The risk score values for these most
frequently targeted internally and externally hosted soft-
ware applications have been calculated using Eq. (2) with Figs. 3
and 4 presenting the risk behaviour demonstrated by the top
7 internally and externally hosted software applications re-
spectively. Table 2 shows the statistics for the modelled risk
behaviour.
Based on risk occurrence statistics in Table 1, Apple-
Appstore, MS-RDP andWeb-browsing were targeted throughout
the considered 144 hours, while SMTP was the least targeted
application – only 9.72% of the 144 hours. Only 3 out of 7 in-
ternally hosted applications were targeted more than 60% of
the observed time while 6 out of 7 externally hosted applica-
tions were targetedmore than 83% over the observed 144 hours.
Further, MS-RDP has shown the most prominent risk score
variation among internally hosted software applications while
Web-browsing resulted in the most prominent risk score varia-
tion among externally hosted software applications (making
externally hosted applications the most vulnerable).
5.2. Alert generation and analysis
We suggest considering a mean risk score value, along with its
probability of exceeding 1 standard deviation frommean, as an
indicator for generating an alert for network administrators.
Analysis of the 7 internally hosted applications (Fig. 3) re-
vealed that the risk score values of dns, ftp, rdp, rpc, smb, smtp
and ssh exceeded their mean risk score values by 38.57%, 16.21%,
55.55%, 51.66%, 47.05%, 64.28% and 21.34% respectively.The prob-
ability of risk score value exceeding more than 1 standard
deviation of the mean value out of the aforementioned
Table 2 – Software application risk statistics.
Application Host Min. Max. Mean Median IQR Std. dev. Occurrence
Apple-Appstore External 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00–0.02 0.02 100.00%
Avast-update External 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00–0.01 0.00 88.88%
DNS Internal 0.00 0.49 0.08 0.06 0.02–0.13 0.07 97.22%
FTP Internal 0.00 1.51 0.01 0.00 0.00–0.00 0.13 25.69%
Funshion External 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.00–0.01 0.01 93.05%
Google-play External 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.00–0.03 0.02 98.61%
RDP Internal 1.16 11.23 7.86 8.25 6.24–10.01 2.48 100.00%
RPC Internal 0.00 0.86 0.04 0.00 0.00–0.04 0.10 41.66%
Sharepoint External 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00–0.00 0.00 83.33%
SMB Internal 0.00 0.70 0.01 0.00 0.00–0.00 0.07 11.80%
SMTP Internal 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00–0.00 0.02 9.72%
SSH Internal 0.00 5.24 0.12 0.00 0.00–0.03 0.60 61.80%
Steam External 0.00 1.47 0.09 0.00 0.00–0.00 0.25 29.16%
Web-browser External 0.00 5.69 0.59 0.25 0.12–0.49 0.99 100.00%
Fig. 5 – Alert generation probabilities for internally hosted applications.
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percentage values for each of these applications (Fig. 5) sug-
gests ssh having the lowest value with both ftp and smtp having
the highest probability.A comparison with ssh suggests that ftp,
smtp, dns, rpc, rdp and smb have 3.16×, 3.16×, 2.02×, 1.84×, 1.54×
and 1.18× more chances than ssh to result in a risk score of ex-
ceeding more than 1 standard deviation of the mean value.
Similarly, the temporal risk behaviour analysis of 7 exter-
nally hosted applications (Fig. 4) revealed that the risk score
values of Apple-Appstore, Avast-update, Funshion, Googleplay,
Sharepoint, Steam andWeb-browsing exceeded their mean risk
score values by 34.72%, 38.58%, 36.56%, 35.91%, 39.49%, 55.00%
and 21.52% respectively over the observation period. Our analy-
sis (from Fig. 6) suggests Funshion having the lowest value with
Steam having the highest risk score probability. A compari-
son with Funshion suggests that Steam, Avast-update,
Sharepoint, Web-browsing, Google-play and Apple-Appstore
have 2.22×, 1.77×, 1.76×, 1.58×, 1.33× and 1.13× more chances
than Funshion to result in a risk score exceeding more than
1 standard deviation of the mean value.
We limit any additional analysis to the top 3 most tar-
geted applications (internally or externally hosted) to identify
potential risk hot spots. Table 3 presents the accumulated risk
score of these applications in different subnetworks, calcu-
lated by summing up the results of Eq. (2) over the 144 hour
observation period. Based on this analysis, GooglePlay has the
smallest risk score among the 6 considered software applica-
tions, while the use of aWeb browser has 14.99× more risk than
GooglePlay – this is due to the significant use of Web-based
access across various devices connected to the University
network. Further, DNS,MS-RDP, SSH and Steam have 7.68×, 4.5×,
4.5× and 2.62× more risks than GooglePlay.
Fig. 7 represents the overall risk associated with different
subnetworks of the University network. The circles represent
the relative riskwith respect to the lowest risk score of theWire-
less subnetwork. The diamond shapes represent the software
that caused risk in a particular subnetwork. Much like a crime
“hotspot” map of terrestrial crime, this diagram provides an
overview of themost “at-risk” sub-networks, and to what extent
Fig. 6 – Alert generation probabilities for externally hosted applications.
Table 3 – Risk score of top software applications across the network.
Subnetwork DNS MSRDP SSH GooglePlay Steam Web-browsing
Campus 9.20 11.25 1.25 1.25 1.42
Campus-ServNet – – 11.25 – – 9.54
DC-DMZ 5.0 – – – – 8.06
Reslan – – – – 5.31 3.04
Untrust 5.0 – – – – 10.43
Wireless – – – 1.25 – 5.00
Network 19.20 11.25 11.25 2.50 6.56 37.49
Fig. 7 – Network level risk.
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particular software and services contribute to such risk. At the
subnetwork level, the overall risk scores considering these 6
software applications for the Campus, Campus-ServNets, DC-
DMZ, Reslan, Untrust and Wireless subnetworks are 24.37, 20.79,
13.06, 8.35, 15.43 and 6.25 respectively.These values have been
calculated using Eq. (3) by summing up the individual risk score
at a particular time instance. Among these sub-networks,Wire-
less has the lowest risk score classifying it as having the lowest
threat level while Campus has 3.90× more risk than Wireless.
Similarly, Campus-ServNet, Untrust, DC-DMZ and Reslan have
higher risks than Wireless sub-network by 3.32×, 2.46×, 2.08×
and 1.33× respectively. It is argued that the Campus subnet-
work hosts more critical data servers and computing nodes
which are used by both students and staff and is therefore more
vulnerable to potential cyber-attacks. Based on our analysis,
we found that MS-RDP is the main source of risk associated
with Campus. Wireless, being mainly used by the visitors, has
a lower risk primarily due to the limited number of potential
applications that are made use of through such a network (pri-
marily email and web-browsing).
5.3. Modelling causes of cyber risk hotspots in software
applications
We further demonstrate how our data and risk framework can
be used to investigate causes of cyber risk hot spots for two of
most at-risk applications: DNS and Web-browsing. Moreover,
DNS in DC-DMZ and Web-browsing in Wireless were targeted
by a single threat – DNS ANY Queries Brute-force DOS attack
andVirus/Win32.WGeneric respectively.Thus, the following sub-
sections only compare multiple threat cases targeting the two
at-risk applications.
5.3.1. DNS
Table 4 presents the number of distinct threats and the number
of times they occur – for different threat categories targeting
the DNS application.This information may be used by network
administrators to improve the security policy of particular sub-
networks they manage.
Fig. 8 illustrates the threat classes for the use of DNS in the
Campus sub-net, the frequency of their occurrence, the clas-
sified severity levels based on the IDS/IPS rules and their Risk
Fig. 8 – DNS threat pattern in the university campus sub-network.
Table 4 – DNS distinct threat count belonging to different
threat categories.
Subnetwork Vulnerability Spyware
Campus 3 2
Untrust 1 2
Fig. 9 – DNS threat pattern in untrust sub-network.
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Fig. 10 – WebBrowsing threat pattern in campus.
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Grade (RG) values. BOT:Torpig Phone, Suspicious DNS Query,
DNS Answer Big TXT record and ISC BIND DNS Resolver Buffer
are considered to impose a greater risk than Microsoft SMTP
Server and Exchange due to their severity level and probabil-
ity of occurrence – leading to a comparatively higher RG value
for these. This suggests that a network administrator should
prioritise on remedies for ISC BIND DNS Resolver Buffer and
Suspicious DNS Query because of their higher RG values.
For comparison, Fig. 9 shows the DNS use within the Untrust
sub-net using the same threat classes of Spyware andVulner-
ability. Our dataset revealed that 95 different Suspicious
DNS Queries, e.g., generic:api.megabrowse.biz, generic:api
.myfindright.com, generic:s.m2pub.com, generic:check
.frogupdate.com, belonging to Spyware class resulted in a
medium level of severity/impact on the system. The “Vulner-
ability” threat class results in a higher severity on the network
– as identified in Fig. 9. The Risk Grade values for Suspicious
DNS Query and Multiple Vendor DNS Message are 1.0995×
and 1.4999× more than the Rogue DNS Servers threat.
The occurrence of Suspicious DNS Query in both Campus
and Untrust sub-nets suggests the use of a similar control for
this threat across both. For other threats, the attack vectors
targeting DNS are different in different sub-nets, requiring these
threats to be considered individually rather than applying the
same controls. More importantly, we can measure the effec-
tiveness of these controls and use the outcome to update the
security policy for DNS-related threats.
5.3.2. Web-browsing
Similar to Table 4, threat categories associated with the web-
browsing application running in different sub-nets are presented
in Table 5.We observe that web-browsing application running
in Campus, Campus-ServNets, DC-DMZ and Untrust sub-nets ex-
ploits vulnerabilities in web-servers; in the Reslan sub-net
Spyware is the main threat category, while in theWireless sub-
net the application is primarily targeted by viruses.We further
use Risk Grade (RG) to determine the attacks requiring higher
priority from a network administrator.
The decision tree showing the Risk Grade (RG) values for
web-browsing in Campus is given in Fig. 10, suggesting that “PHP
Fig. 11 – WebBrowsing threat pattern in Campus-ServNets.
Fig. 12 – WebBrowsing threat pattern in DC-DMZ sub-net.
Table 5 – Web-browsing distinct threat count belonging
to different threat categories.
Subnetwork Vulnerability Spyware File Virus
Campus 10 2 2 1
Campus-ServNets 3 0 0 0
DC-DMZ 6 0 0 0
Reslan 4 6 3 3
Untrust 2 1 0 1
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Fig. 13 – WebBrowsing threat pattern in Reslan subnet.
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XMLRPX Library Remote Code Execution” vulnerability has
the highest RG, followed by “MS Word RTF Parsing Engine
Memory Corruption” vulnerability and “MS Windows Media
Malformed AVI Parsing”. These have also been identified
to be “critical”, suggesting urgent input from a network
administrator.
In Campus-ServNets, web-browsing has three threats in the
“Vulnerability” class with varying levels of severity (see Fig. 11),
with “ASP.NET Info. Leak” dominating (based on its Risk Grade
value) and identified as being “critical”. In the DC-DMZ sub-
net (see Fig. 12), “PHP CGI Code Injection threat” has the highest
severity – indicating greater required input from a network
administrator.
Like Campus, web-browsing in Reslan sub-net (see Fig. 13)
has four threat categories associated with it, namely: File,
Spyware, Virus and Vulnerability. According to the Risk Grade
values and severity levels, the greatest threats occur in the
“Spyware” and “Vulnerability” categories. Both of these require
additional support from a network administrator to handle
these threats – the highest being the “ScreenBlaz” spyware –
a malicious Trojan virus that has been the main cause of
browser hijacking in Win32 systems.
Three threat categories, Spyware, Virus and Vulnerability,
were observed in Untrust sub-net when using web-browsing
service (see Fig. 14). The Risk Grade values for Ponmocup.Gen
C&C, HTTP related and ASP.NET Path are more than Virus/
Win32 threat by 1.9900×, 1.5632× and 1.5012× respectively
suggesting that a network administrator should first find a re-
sponse for Ponmocup.Gen C&C.
Comparison across these suggests that “HTTP SQL Injec-
tion” is a common threat occurring in Campus, Campus-
ServNets and DC-DMZ sub-nets. Similarly, HTTP related threats
are common in DC-DMZ and Untrust sub-nets. This suggests
that: (i) a greater focus should be considered on such com-
monly occurring threats; (ii) controls used for this threat can
be shared across multiple sub-nets. The treatment of remain-
ing threats requires individual actions on the part of network
administrator.
6. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we developed a risk assessment framework that
we propose could be used by network administrators and people
responsible for managing network security risk to take a high-
level view of the overall network and immediately identify sub-
nets at risk to quickly identify the cause of the risk, taking
remedial action to rectify the problem.We demonstrated the
application of the framework using real-world data collected
from a Local Area Network to Internet gateway.
It was evident within the results that externally hosted soft-
ware applications, such as Steam and Google-play, are leading
to threats from malicious files, which require a different type
of threat management from the internally hosted software ap-
plications, such as DNS, where the software application itself
is proving to the key vulnerability. This is a reflection of the
new type of risk evolving from Cloud services and ad-hoc
devices downloading and running applications on the network.
The key threats are coming from outside and being intention-
ally pulled into the network, rather than attackers having to
hack their way into the system. The ad-hoc use of personal
devices within corporate networks could exacerbate this
problem, and we have developed the framework so that it can
identify software or application-specific risks within a sub-
net to support the management and identification of emerging
risks due to the range of “apps”.
We have provided a snap shot of several days and shown
how the most pertinent threats fluctuate and alter over time.
This is an important finding as it suggests a static security so-
lution that aims to mitigate risk at a network level is not as
suitable as a risk management model that can be dynamic and
reactive to emerging risks at a sub-net level.The temporal aspect
of the framework is flexible and could be reduced to a few hours
or many months, providing shorter and longer views on risk
over time.We suggest that, if this kind of activity were to take
place periodically, it would allow network security policies to
be updated and enforced more effectively and efficiently,
Fig. 14 – WebBrowsing threat pattern in untrust.
45c om pu t e r s & s e cu r i t y 5 7 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 3 1 – 4 6
reducing harm to the network and keeping in line with the
current modus-operandi of cyber criminal network behaviour.
With so many risk assessment framework standards emerg-
ing, it is important to remember that risk assessment in Cyber
security must occur frequently and remain an active process
– even after the standard processes of asset identification, threat
and vulnerability assessment, and impact analysis are complete.
Our results use a single local area network to demonstrate
the framework. Although it is a large network with a variety of
use cases, from personal to corporate to scientific research, we
cannot yet claim that the proposed framework would be
generalisable to finance, retail, and industry control systems or
healthcare settings. Thus, we suggest that this work provide a
foundation and clarion call for further research in this area
and the publication of findings across a variety of contexts to
provide comparable results from which to build evidence of a
generalisable real-time risk assessment framework.
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